The paper investigates institutional quality in countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), accession and candidate countries (ACC) and new member states (NMS) of the European Union. Several conclusions emerge. Firstly, ENP countries show less institutional convergence than candidate countries. Secondly, corruption is perceived as greater in ENP countries than elsewhere. Thirdly, ENP lags in democratic consolidation especially with respect to political and civil liberties. We construct an index of institutional quality in the public sector to track changes over time between the three regions. This reveals improvements in ENP in institutions supporting R&D and the use of ICT, while institutional progress to support education and innovation has fallen behind the EU average. We conclude that the EU has not yet played an important role as a "transformative power" and that the process of institutional reform in ENP is incomplete due to an absence of a clear European perspective.
INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the 1990s and the transformation of the former socialist countries, interest in the quality of institutions as a determinant of economic growth has increased considerably. The idea that good economic institutions in both the public and the private sectors have a distinctive role to play in supporting economic development is now widely acknowledged (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Rodrik, 2008) . It is often argued that welldesigned institutions can trigger economic growth and act as important growth accelerators (Housemann, Prichett and Rodrik, 2004) . A positive link between the quality of institutions and economic growth has been widely explored and empirically tested. 1 Increasingly, investors take the quality of institutions into account as an important factor for doing business and in assessing the overall risk of future business operations. This is because the institutional framework creates both incentives and disincentives for economic transactions and business decisions. Firms are generally keen to invest in countries where property rights are protected, which have a developed legal framework and enforce the rule of law, and whose public services avoid burdensome bureaucracy, redundant regulation and corruption. It is also important that government policies are transparent, that the judiciary does not hinder business and that there is strong protection against crime and fraud.
Institutional failures, on the other hand, significantly raise transaction costs for firms if public institutions fail adequately to enforce property rights, fail to protect business contracts or fail to ensure an adequate level of information to all market agents. Underlying rules of conduct, both formal and informal, of citizens and enterprises, together with instruments to control corruption, are also important and mirror the capacity of society to effectively enforce regulations and contracts (Budak, 2006; Budak and Sumpor, 2009) . In this paper, we take all these elements into account in measuring the quality of the institutional framework.
Political institutions affect the choice and shape of economic institutions both directly and indirectly, although the relation between institutions, governance and economic growth is complex (Acemoglu et al. 2004) . A central hypothesis in exploring the impact of the quality of political institutions on economic development is that a strong and stable set of economic institutions which create incentives for economic development could only be achieved if they rely on political institutions which guarantee political and civil freedoms and the rule of law (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012) . A distribution and limitation of political power, accompanied by political inclusiveness also determines economic success or failure and a "combination of inclusive political and economic institutions shapes the incentives needed for societies to prosper" (Acemoglu et al, 2004) . This is a point of departure of our analysis.
Although it is difficult to determine which political institutions and governance contracts matter most for economic outcomes, the institutional and governance structures are important for understanding the path of economic growth and why some countries have been more successful than others in building pro-market institutions. (Beck and Laeven, 2005) . The transition countries have had different degrees of success, but the gap in development levels suggests that those countries that are better integrated into the EU demonstrate better long-term economic performance and governance capacities and that the quality of the institutional framework could provide some answers why this is so. We argue that having transparent, stable and well-functioning political and economic institutions has a positive impact on economic development and the integration prospects of the ENP countries. The conceptual framework for the analysis of the quality of ENP institutions reflects the analysis of Monastiriotis and Borrell (2012) , Ascani et al. (2012) and 2 .
In this paper we examine the quality of institutions as measured by governance indicators and assess the degree of harmonization with the EU in two ENP countries, Ukraine and Moldova, which have both stated their political aspirations to integrate with the EU and have started to work towards institutional arrangements to achieve that goal. Public governance institutions affect the conditions in which economic agents, entrepreneurs and citizens interact, especially with regard to: a) the stability of political institutions and accountability of the government; b) voice in government policy-making; c) extensiveness of corruption and state capture) quality of entrepreneurial infrastructure and business environment, and e) quality of public services (education, quality of research and development system, innovation system). Among their effects, we distinguish between those that affect all citizens, such as the stability of political institutions, the accountability of government and the level of corruption and those that affect entrepreneurs and investors, such as the business environment and the quality of public services. The analysis that follows identifies the trends of convergence and divergence in the quality of governance indicators for the selected countries. The analysis also explores whether the pressure of Europeanization has provided an incentive to develop structures and institutions compatible with the other EU member states. For accession and candidate countries, the EU membership negotiations have also been an important external influence on national policies, institutions and governance structures, while the EU neighbourhood countries have been able to acquaint themselves with the conditionality and procedures for the accession.
In the next section we explore the quality of public governance focusing on political stability, government accountability, and perceptions of corruption drawing a several international databases that provide information about these aspects of governance. In section 3 we explore relevant indicators on the quality of public services, focusing on services that are relevant for growth and recovery from the economic crisis including education, innovation, R&D and the use of ICT. In section four we set out our conclusions and implications of the analysis for policy in the ENP region.
QUALITY OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE -DEFINITIONS AND METHODOLOGY
Governance can be defined as "the traditions and institutions by which the authority in a country is exercised" (Kaufman et al., 2010: 4) . Effective governance leads to political stability, and involves government accountability, protection of civil liberties and the control of corruption. We make use of governance indicators measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank's "Governance Matters" database (Kaufmann, et al., 2010) . Our analysis will also use data from other available international sources including Freedom House, Transparency International, UNESCO and World Economic Forum (WEF).
The institutions of public governance (both formal and informal) including their negative manifestations such as corruption and state capture shape the business environment in many transition countries, especially in the ENP region. The quality of political and institutional governance has an important effect on economic performance and growth because the choice of institutions reflects the distribution of political power and economic resources (Acemoglu et al 2004; Kaufman et al., 2010) . Also, interest groups and ruling elites may succeed through rent-seeking in creating institutions that are favourable to themselves rather than to the wider society (Bartlett and Prica, 2012) .
Political and administrative corruption has been shown to be a major obstacle for doing business (Griffits et al., 2009; Grodeland and Aasland, 2011; Dreher and Gassebner, 2007) .
We therefore examine the quality of institutions that have been set up to combat corruption. Also, the analysis explores the "governance gap" between the selected countries and the EU, and assesses the effectiveness of institutions that aim to bridge this gap.
Our analysis of the quality of governance involves an examination of indicators at two levels: The focus of the study is on the analysis of quantifiable indices that measure qualitative variables. In measuring the quality of public sector institutions we construct a synthetic indicator, which we call the Public Sector Institutional Quality Index. We identify trends in convergence or divergence of the selected countries by changes in the coefficient of variation of the index over the period 2004 to 2011.
The quality of political and institutional governance
In this section we analyse the quality of the institutions of governance using indicators of political stability, government accountability, success in the control of corruption, protection This most likely reflects the effect of EU conditionality in the run-up to accession in the ACC region, and the subsequent falling behind when this conditionality was lifted after countries (Bulgaria and Romania in this case) acessed the EU in the NMS region.
Taking individual countries into account, despite progress in compliance with democratic principles and the rule of law, Ukraine and Moldova are both fragile in terms of political stability, freedom of expression, media freedoms, and the implementation of electoral processes 6 . Both are characterised by low levels of government accountability and confusing responsibility chains. Dealing with corruption is the greatest problem these countries face.
This is not surprising, given the political struggles and social and economic instability of the last decade. The global financial crisis has only aggravated the problems of public governance in Ukraine and Moldova.
Croatia is the best ranked country overall for all three indicators (see Table A1 ) since it has successfully complied with all the required political conditionality during the accession process, and transposed most of the common legal rules and adjusted its institutional system to the EU acquis communautaire as a precondition for joining the EU on 1 July 2013.
Macedonia is trailing with much lower scores, especially when it comes to perceptions of political stability 7 .
Somewhat surprisingly, the indicators for both Bulgaria and Romania are weaker than for
Croatia, indicating problems in the control of corruption, freedom of media and civil liberties and political stability. Romania made some progress in political stability after joining the EU, but not in other dimensions, while in Bulgaria, indicators for the control of corruption, voice and accountability of government have worsened since 2007. Intensified monitoring over combating corruption and increasing the effectiveness of the judiciary over the last five years have failed to produce improvements in these areas. Given this outcome, the tougher accession conditionality for Croatia and other candidate countries seems to be justified as the motivation for policy change appears to be much higher in the pre-accession period.
Corruption perception index
The WGI scores are composed from sub-indices drawn from Freedom House and Transparency International, which have a rather different focus from one another. We therefore complement our analysis of corruption indicators by looking at the Transparency international Corruption Perception Index dataset, which provides more detail about how the problem of corruption in public administration is dealt with. 
Democratic consolidation
Freedom House provides additional indicators of political stability, respect for political rights and freedoms, local democratic governance, free media, the expression of other civil liberties and control of corruption. These indicators are grouped into various including consolidated democracies (scores 1.00-2.99); semi-consolidated democracies (3.00-3.99); In Moldova, there were no significant shifts in the assessment of the level of the democratic governance, as the country remained only "Partly Free" throughout the period, although there were some signs of progress in 2011 especially with regard media environment and loosening of the political influence over the media. On the other hand, there were setbacks in the protection of minority rights, including gay rights, where the government was forced to withdraw a EU-backed Anti-Discrimination Law.
The Freedom House data also confirm that Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania and Macedonia belong to the group of consolidated democracies and could be considered as free societies with democratic respect of political and civil liberties, free media, academic and other freedoms. Their ability to control corruption is higher, despite the fact that the problems remain. while other indicators measure the ability of the educational system to produce experts able to use sophisticated skills in business strategies. Other indicators measure quality of public institutions indirectly by assessing their impact on the private sector (see Tables A3 ). The four dimensions are each derived on the basis of three indicators that are set out in the Appendix (see Table A5 ). To make the data comparable, we use the original rank values for each indicator, as presented in the WEF Global Competitiveness Survey data, 2006-2010.
QUALITY OF PUBLIC SERVICES
Taking the average of these rank values gives the score for each dimension. Finally, we take the average value of the four dimensions to create a single Index of the Quality of Public
Institutions. These scores are normalised in relation to values for the EU15=100 (see Figure   6 ) in order to identify the gap between the ACC, ENP and NMS regions in relation to the EU15 countries 9 .
Figure 6 about here
The overall score for Ukraine is not as low as one might expect, given the relatively low level of development. The score for the NMS countries (Bulgaria and Romania), is lower than for Croatia and not much different to Macedonia. Moldova stands out as having the lowest value of the Index.
Considering the individual dimensions that make up the index, Croatia has similar values across all four dimensions (see Table A3 ). Romania is more advanced in innovation and education, while significantly lagging behind in use of ICT. The Ukraine is similar, with rather good performance in education, but very low in the use of ICT. Bulgaria has a significantly low score in the use of ICT. Moldova has good performance in innovation, while education and R&D lag behind. Finally, Macedonia has the weakest performance with relatively low scores in R&D and use of ICT.
In order to show the relative performance across regions, values of the index and its dimensions were compared to the average of the "old" EU members (EU15=100). This exercise shows how much are the three regions lag behind the EU15 countries (see Figure 7) . Europe region as a whole (i.e. for all six countries). To assess whether the six countries converge or diverge from each other, we calculated the coefficient of variation for these countries (see Table 1 ). 
CONCLUSIONS
The paper has investigated the patterns of change in institutional reform in several countries representing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the accession countries (ACC) and the new member stats (NMS). Several conclusions emerge from the analysis.
Firstly, the ENP countries show a weaker performance over time than candidate countries or the new member states of South East Europe. Political stability, governmental accountability, and control of corruption all score lower on the various indicators we have examined in the ENP region than in the ACC or NMS regions. In addition while the ACC and NMS regions are broadly improving the quality of their political and institutional governance, the ENP region seems to be falling behind in most respects. The creation of "endogenous institutions" and the introduction of incentives to eliminate the deeply rooted tolerance for corruption in the Western Balkans and ENP countries would help to eliminate the "governance gap" between these countries and the EU.
Secondly, we have focused our attention on the issue of corruption in which the ENP region appears to be doing relatively worse than the ACC or NMS regions. Looking at a variety of indicators we have shown that the ACC region has moved ahead of the NMS region in some respects, due to the strong impact of accession conditionality, while there is evidence of backsliding among the NMS after they became EU members in 2007. Additionally we found that corruption perceptions are relatively unfavourable in the ENP in the sectors of political parties and the judiciary, while they are relatively better in the ACC countries in the sectors of public officials and the police.
Thirdly, although Ukraine and Moldova have shown considerable progress in democratic consolidation over the last eight years, they lag behind other comparator countries in the study as they are still considered as only "partly free" societies with respect to political and civil liberties, and in some respects are even backsliding in relation to some of the available indicators. We conclude that, the EU has not yet played an important role as a "transformative power" shaping faster institutional convergence in the ENP region and there is a danger that the reform processes will either stagnate or "run out of steam" if the EU does not take a more decisive role in the process. In sum, the process of institutional reform appears incomplete due to an absence of a clear European perspective.
Fourthly, We constructed an index of institutional quality in the public sector and use this to track changes over time between the three regions and individual countries. The analysis showed some evidence of convergence in performance between countries suggesting that the ENP has caught up to some extent with the EU average at least to that of the NMS region. The analysis of quality of public service institutions in particuar sectors also revealed that while the index scores for education and innovation have fallen behind the EU average since the onset of the economic crisis, capacities for change are progressing based largely on an improvements in R&D and the use of ICT. Such progress should be commended and further supported by the EU institutions and assistance programmes. Moldova, it is rather surprising that the EU has failed to promote stronger transformative processes and to encourage a faster evolution of democratic governance institutions in both countries. The EU has therefore failed to maximise its "transformative power" to promote institutional convergence 10 . Under such circumstances, there is a danger that reform processes will either stagnate or "run out of steam" if they are postponed indefinitely. If the EU does not take a more decisive role, the process could even go into reverse. Freedom House, Country Reports, 2004 , http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/freedom-world-2012 2 These papers were also produced within the SEARCH project 3 Croatia became a member state of the EU on 1 st July 2013, but during most of the period covered by this paper. Croatia became an EU candidate state in June 2004. 4 The data for 2011 are still not publically available. 5 Macedonia became a candidate for EU membership in December 2005 6 Data are provided in the Appendix 7 The opening of negotiations on the Macedonia's EU membership application has been blocked by Greece in a dispute over the name of the country, which Greece disputes. 8 For comparison, according to UNODC Report "Corruption in Croatia: Bribery as Experienced by the Population" (2011) based on field survey results of systemic and petty corruption which focuses more on people's experiences with bribe rather than perceptions, the rate of population paying bribes to public officials is higher and amounts around 11%. 9 The EU 15 are the member states of the EU prior to the eastern Enlargement of 2004. 10 Many analysts note that in the last decade the EU has more prioritised self-interests in the policies towards ENC countries (for instance energy security supply) then true democratic transformation of these countries (c.f. Altmann et al, 2010, Niemann and de Wekker, 2010) . 
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